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iABSTRACT 
 
 
 
A CONSIDERATION OF THE OWNERSHIP AND GOVERNANCE 
STRUCTURE IN A PRIVATIZED PUBLIC ENTERPRISE: CASE STUDY OF 
KOREA TELECOM - 
 
 
By 
 
 
Pyung Hwan Yang 
 
 
 
 
This study examines corporate governance and ownership structure in a privatized 
public enterprise focusing on the KT case. KT is the Korean representative public enterprise that 
accomplished a perfect privatization on May 2002 in the stream of privatizing the public sector. 
Through the summarizing the background of public enterprise management and 
privatization and comparing the KT with other privatization and corporate governance 
structure of foreign developed telecommunication firms such as BT and NTT, this paper 
inquire the efficient ownership and governance system of KT, the privatized public 
enterprise. Especially, we consider the board management and organization. 
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1Ⅰ.  INTRODUCTION 
The political and economic policy of privatization, broadly defined as the 
deliberate sale by a government of state-owned enterprises or assets to private economic 
agents, is now in use worldwide. Since its introduction by Britain’s Thatcher 
government in the early 1980s to a skeptical public (that included many economists), 
privatization now appears to be accepted as a legitimate- often a core – tool of statecraft 
by governments of more than 100 countries. Privatization became one of the most 
important elements of the continuing global phenomenon of the increasing use of 
markets to allocate resources.1  
 
A privatization is a changing ownership from the government to the private and 
the main constituent is an origin owner, the government. Also, a privatization should be 
decided and progressed in the point of national people economic view because the 
possession and the selling decision of public enterprise were committed as ‘an agency of the 
people’. In other words, it means that it should be presented explicitly: why privatization is 
desirable in the point of national people economic view? , what appearance and what 
process is needed in order to attain this purpose?  
                                            
1 After almost a decade of steady growth during the 1990s, and peaking at around USD 100 
billion in 1998, privatization proceeds dropped to just over USD 20 billion in 2001. 
OECD Recent Privatization Trends in OECD Countries, 2002, pp. 43-45  
2In addition, a core ingredient of privatization is the change of corporate 
ownership, governance and a behavior of management that will happen after 
privatization. Thus, the grasp of the point that the national economic meaning of 
privatization is the same as the work that analyze the extending efficiency caused by the 
change of a corporate ownership and governance with a relevant firm. This is not a 
problem that can be concluded theoretically but a subject that be able to change 
according to the situation such as Korean economy and a characteristic of the 
government and company. On the other hand, there is a viewpoint that it must be 
discussed that a privatization that contain the meaning of changing a ownership 
structure should be separated from a problem of corporate governance after a 
privatization. However, this assertion is based on the groundless belief. Namely, they 
believe the corporate governance related to private motive and selection after a 
privatization will be consistent with the desirable result in the point of national 
economic view. Therefore, the government should drive a privatization with considering 
desirable corporate governance after a privatization. It must be prohibited by 
standardized approach to a privatization and be a work that is based on the concrete 
analysis to a objective firm and situation 
The purpose of this paper is to inquire corporate governance and ownership 
3structure in privatization focusing on the KT case.2 KT is the Korean representative 
public enterprise that accomplished a perfect privatization on May 2002 in the stream of 
privatizing the public sector.3  
The paper is organized as follows: In the next section, we summarize the 
background of public enterprise management and privatization. In section 3, we 
compare the KT with other privatization and corporate governance structure of foreign 
developed telecommunication firms such as BT and NTT. In section 4, we inquire the 
privatization of KT and efficient ownership and governance system in the privatized 
public enterprise. Especially, we consider the board management and organization. 
                                            
2  The rapid change in technologies and convergence between industries in the 
telecommunications area worldwide have made many countries pay much attention to the 
telecommunications policy at the government level intentionally. In spite of numerous benefits 
enjoyable from the coming of the information age, however, each of those countries is facing 
important but difficult problems concerning with how it does bring up and manage its own 
telecommunications industry. In Korea, privatization of telecommunications services, which had 
been provided by the government-owned telecom operator during the last several decades, and 
limited competition were introduced into the telecommunications market in the 1980s. 
Hwi won Kang, “Privatization and Competition in the Telecommunications Industry and 
Changing Role of Government in Korea” A collection of learned papers in Pyung Taek 
University, 1997, Vol.9 No.2,pp.435-437 
3 So far, there have been two actual waves of reform efforts aimed at privatizing the public 
enterprise sector. In late 1997, the Kim Young Sam administration introduced the Act for 
Privatization and Improvement of the Efficiency of Large Public Enterprises, generally referred 
to as the ‘Special Act on Privatization,’ to promote privatization of four large public enterprises. 
The act aimed at reforming corporate governance structures of commercial public enterprises to 
be privatized, while at the same time preventing takeover by chaebols , Korean conglomerate, 
during their privatization. The second wave of reform, initiated by the current administration 
that came to power at the peak of the economic crisis, is still unfolding. The current 
administration turned over large shares of public enterprises to private hands. It is also 
transforming the electricity industry from a vertically integrated public enterprise monopoly into 
a competitive industry operated by private interests. 
Il Chong Nam, Recent Developments in the public Enterprise Sector of Korea, Dec.2001, Korea 
Development Institute. pp.8-10 
4Ⅱ. A BACKGROUND OF PUBLIC ENTERPRISE MANAGEMENT 
AND PRIVATIZATION 
     
    1. The private and public: ownership & corporate governance 
        
       The problem of corporate governance becomes interesting only when  
ownership and control are separated, as in a firm owned by shareholders and 
controlled by managers.4  When the same person has both ownership and control, 
as in the case of a firm directly managed by its owner, there is no meaningful 
corporate governance problem: Presumably, the owner-manager can perfectly 
monitor his or her own performance. 
        When ownership and control are separated, however, it is important to  
devise an incentive and monitoring scheme to make sure that the managers work in 
the interest of the owners rather than their own.  The reasoning is as follows: The 
owners bear the residual risk and receive the residual reward.  In other words, the 
owners have a claim on risks and rewards in situations not specified in contracts.  
It is, however, the managers who control the decision-making process and therefore 
make critical decisions that influence those risks and rewards, and the managers' 
                                            
4  Fama, Eugene and Michael C. Jensen, "Separation of Ownership and Control,",1983, 
Journal of Law and Economics 26, pp.327-349. 
 
5objectives may diverge from the owners' interests.  It is not difficult to imagine 
cases in which managers sacrifice the interests of shareholders for the gratification 
of their own interests, through pay raises, empire-building, and so on.5 
       It is important to note that this problem of corporate governance arises from 
three factors: (1) The owner (the principal) and the manager (the agent) have 
different objectives; (2) The owner cannot perfectly monitor the behaviour and 
decision of the manager; (3) The owner cannot anticipate and specify all 
contingencies in the contract with the manager.  Under the conditions of 
asymmetric information and incomplete contracts, the principal must formulate an 
efficient incentive scheme to ensure that the agent acts in the principal's rather than 
the agent's best interest.6  
        This problem of corporate governance exists in both public and private firms 
as long as ownership and control are separated.  After all, most large private firms 
are owned by shareholders and controlled by professional managers.  While 
shareholders presumably want to maximize profit, managers may pursue their own 
                                            
5 Hart, Oliver, Firms, Contracts and Financial Structure,1995, Oxford University Press. 
6 The problem of corporate governance in both public and private firms would disappear under 
complete contracts and symmetric information. The principal and the agent originally may have 
different interests, but the principal could use complete contracts and perfect monitoring to 
make sure that the agent's interests are brought in line with those of the principal's. In reality, 
however, the principal cannot anticipate and specify all contingencies, the agent will look for 
loopholes in the contract, and the principal cannot perfectly monitor the agent's performance. 
6agenda.7 It is simply wrong to assume that the divergence of their interests is 
smaller than that between the owners and managers of public enterprises.   
   Now, if the basic nature of the corporate governance problem in both 
private and public firms is identical, any difference in performance between public 
and private firms must arise either from differences in objectives or differences in 
incentives schemes.  Otherwise, it should be possible for the government to make 
public managers to pursue profit maximization and eliminate the differences 
between public and private ownership regimes-- without resorting to privatization. 
        This may sound obvious once explained, but it is a point often missed in the 
debate on privatization.  For instance, Stephen P. King(1998: 8) writes: "A key 
difference between ownership regimes is the beneficiary of increases in the value 
of the assets that underlie the business.”8  A public sector manager has no claims 
on these assets.  The assets belong to the government.  In contrast, a private 
owner retains the assets and has the right to sell them and receive the value of the 
assets through this sale."  King implicitly assumes that the private manager and 
                                            
7 In order to have managers pursue profit maximization, an appropriate incentive compensation 
scheme must be devised.  As risk-averse managers with superior information have to be paid 
risk premium and information rent, however, firm performance may still deviate from the 
objective of profit maximization. 
8 King, Stephen P., “Privatization: Does Reality Match the Rhetoric?,” Department of 
Economics Research Paper in the University of Melbourne,1998, No. 634. pp.5-16 
7the private owner are one and the same person and in effect eliminates the 
principal-agent problem under private ownership.9 
   
     2. A privatization & ownership and governance structure of public             
enterprise in recent Korean context 
   
    The core difference between state and private ownership, from a governance 
perspective, is the rights, obligations and pay-offs attaching to ownership. Government 
ownership confers only a very limited set of rights on the ostensible owner or 
shareholder.  Stakeholders of the public enterprise include employees and managers, 
just as in private firms. But the most important stakeholders are the bureaucrats and 
politicians. The nature of ownership and control of public enterprise differs 
fundamentally from that of a private firm in two respects. Most of all, as the owner or a 
dominant shareholder, the government pursues not only financial return, but policy 
objective as well. In another sense, bureaucrats and politicians who control a public 
enterprise on behalf of the general public do not have personal financial stakes, unlike 
shareholders of private firms. The main five Korean Public Enterprise Ownership 
                                            
9 Won Hyuk Lim ,”Liberalization Before Privatization: A Corporate Governance Perspective on 
Market Institutions and Ownership Regimes “November 1999,Korea development Institute 
pp.10-12  
 
8structure is as follow. 
<Table Ⅱ-1  > Main Shareholders of the “Big Five” and Their Shares (Dec., 2000) 
                                                 
Name Main Stockholders 
KOGAS 
 - Korean Government: 26.9% 
 - KEPCO: 24.5% 
 - Local Government: 9.8% 
 - Daeshin Securities: 7.2% 
 - Foreigners: 2.1% 
KT & G 
 - Korean Government: 13.8% 
 - Industrial Bank of Korea: 35.2% 
-The Export-Import Bank of Korea: 7.0% 
-Daehan Investment Trust: 7.0% 
 - Foreigners: 5.0% 
POSCO 
 - Industrial Bank of Korea: 4.9% 
 - Foreigners: 48.6% 
KEPCO 
 - Korean Government: 52.2% 
 - Korea Deposit Insurance Corp.: 5.1% 
 - Foreigners: 26.0% 
Korea Heavy Industries and 
Construction Co., Ltd. 
(Doosan Heavy Industries and 
Construction Co., Ltd.) 
 - Doosan Corp.: 36.0% 
 - Korea Development Bank: 12.6% 
 - KEPCO: 11.7% 
Source: National Information & Credit Evaluation. 
 The corporate governance of a public enterprise before the introduction of the 1997 
Special Act on Privatization depended on whether or not it was subject to the 
Framework Act. The Framework Act required that a State-Owned Corporation (SOC) 
board consist of a member from the line ministry, another from the then Economic 
9Planning Board (EPB),10 and the rest were recruited from outside of the government. 
The board members who were not from the government were mainly lawyers and 
professors appointed by the government. The board reviewed and made decisions on the 
issues of importance, such as key investment decisions and appointment of executives. 
In reviewing and making decisions on the agenda, the board was required by the act to 
put priority on public policy considerations. 
 Although there were nine board members, the one from the line ministry played a 
decisive role. The board member from the economic planning board played a secondary 
role of checking for wasteful activities. The remaining members from outside the 
government generally were not expected to play a significant role and usually approved 
an agenda that had already been negotiated by the two members from the government. 
The board member from the line ministry intervened heavily with the management of a 
SOC. The board members were paid only token amounts of money for their services 
and did not have any monetary incentives in the financial performance of a public 
enterprise for which they worked.  
        The government without active participation of the board selected the CEOs of the 
                                            
10 The Economic Planning Board was charged with the task of planning and budgeting as well 
as that of coordinating economic policies of various ministries. The board later merged with the 
Ministry of Finance. 
10
SOCs. Political appointment was not rare. The rest of the top executives were usually 
selected from the bureaucracy of the SOCs themselves.  
 
 <Table Ⅱ-2 > The main revised contents in the Basic Management Law of State-
Owned Corporations on Oct. 1998 
    
 Before revised After revised 
Management institution 
The managerial 
evaluation Committee 
of SOC 
The operation committee of 
SOC 
Board system Non-executive director Executive or non-executive co-existence 
Government  board appointment Two member Abolished. 
Number of the board Within ten member Within fifteen (half non-executive) 
Nomination Committee of CEO No 
Introduction (comprised by 
non-executive and civil 
member recommended by the 
board 
Process of appointment of CEO 
Asked  by  Minister 
ÆThe president was 
appointed. 
Recommended by 
Nomination CommitteeÆ 
Asked by a MinisterÆThe 
president was appointed. 
Management Contract system No Introduction 
Asking for Auditor appointment Asked by a Minister of main office 
Asked by a operation 
committee 
Announcement of Management No Announce a balance sheet & management result 
Minor shareholder right system No Introduction 
 
   Source : The Report data of the Ministry of Budget & Planning  
      Law barred appointment of ex-government officials to a position in a SOC other than 
11
CEO. Executive pay was generally lower than that in private firms. Incentive-based 
management contracts were not used. Top executives, in particular CEOs, usually 
considered themselves as bureaucrats belonging to the government rather than 
executives of a business organization. The SOCs had to submit annual budget plans to 
the government, which regularly evaluated their performance. In addition to being 
subject to a strict quota on the number of employees and the number of managerial 
positions, they were also regularly audited by the Office of the Inspector General and 
the National Assembly. 
 
  Ⅲ. A PRIVATIZATION & CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
STRUCTURE OF FOREIGN DEVELOPED TELECOM BUSINESS 
     
       1. British Telecom 
1.1 Privatization  
    In 1973, the BT11 got a large amount of financial losses because the 
government suppressed the BT’s raising of a charge in order to control rapid 
inflation rate after oil shock. Of course, however, it could not cope with the 
                                            
11 Until 1981 what later became British Telecom was the Post Office Telecommunications and 
therefore part of the Post Office corporation. In 1981 it was separated from the Post Office and 
became a free standing corporation through still publicly owned. 
Stephen Martin and David Parker, The impact of Privatization: Ownership and corporate 
performance in the UK, 1997,London and New York: Routledge, pp.43-44 
12
enormous financial loss and at last raise a charge by 75 percent. This measurement 
result in only customer’s dissatisfaction. In this situation, the government decided 
to sell it’s stock share of BT for the purpose of reducing the national debt and 
strengthen the external competition.  
   In November 1984 50.2 percent of the share capital was sold through an offer 
for sale targeted at the small shareholder and with some shares set aside for 
employees. Under the terms of the sale no person was permitted to own more than 
15 percent of the share capital. The remainders of the company’s shares were sold 
in two further trenches in 1991 and 1993.  
  <Table Ⅲ-1  > The result of a stock sale                   (unit: million) 
The ratio of subscription for 
stock (abroad)  Date 
The No. 
of share 
The ratio 
of 
share(%) 
The sale 
price(₤)
Individual(%) Institute(%)
First12  Nov.1984 3060 50.2 3900 39 61(17) 
Sec. Nov.1991 1580 25.9 5400 67 33(13) 
Third July.1993 1220 21.9 5400 55 45(17) 
Total  5860 97.0 14700   
Source: Internal data of KT ‘ The process of privatization and the result in BT’1999  
In the first selling, the BT stock was sold by 15 the UK bank consortium that is 
                                            
12 Before the first selling, the BT’s stock was listed in the London, New York, Toronto stock 
market, and there was a constraint that one stockholder could not own over 15percent of voting 
right stocks. But to the foreigner, there was no restraint article.  
13
based on Kleinwort Benson as a main bank in the domestic market. Also, a 
acquisition institution which was consist of the Morgan Stanley, Mcleod Yong 
Weir of the Canada and Normura stock company of the Japan bought the stock 
and distribute each other. The UK government designed a separated payment 
system to minimize hardship preparing for payment funds and extending 
efficiency in the stock market.13 Moreover, the government tried to broaden 
employee stock ownership. It assigned total 12million stocks by allocating 54 
stocks per capita and sold stocks at a reduced price by 84 million numbers to 
employees. Also, the government encouraged to invest through an incentive in 
order to prevent a wrong behavior that the stakeholders sold their stock to gain 
profits through a differentiation of time immediately.14             
  1.2 Ownership & Corporate governance  
1.2.1 Attainment of distributive ownership 
  The BT achieved wide distributive ownership through the people’s share 
program and the prevention of obtaining excessive shares over regular boundary. 
                                            
13 Therefore the stakeholders could pay their money with separated way like 50 pence per stock 
on November 1984, 40 pence on June 1985 and 40 pence on April 1986.   
14 If stakeholders have a stock over 3 years, they can take a incentive : to a bill voucher, it was 
given a 18 pound gift right per stock and as a bonus share, it was provided one stock per 
retained 10 stocks by maximum 400 stocks with free.   
Kee Jin Yang, “ The study of privatization of public enterprise “A collection of learned 
papers in Dong-yui university Dec. 2002 pp.34-35  
14
On April 2000, total number of stakeholders are 1.8million, and there are only 
seven persons who have stakes over one percent.15                                
<Table Ⅲ-2 > The present condition of ownership in BT  
Ordinary Shares  
Size of Shareholding  
(at 31 March 2000) 
Number of 
Shareholder
Percentage 
of total
Number of 
shares held 
(million)  
Percentage of 
total 
1-399 816,165 45.0 173 2.7 
400- 799  524,396 28.9 283 4.3 
800- 1,599 317,874 17.6 347 5.3 
1,600- 9,999 147,638 8.2 395 6.1 
10,000- 99, 999 3,742 0.2 96 1.5 
100,000-999,999 1,378 0.1 482 7.4 
1,000,000-4,999,999 377 0.0 839 12.9 
5,000,000 and above 173 0.0 3,892 59.8 
Total 1,811,743 100.0 6,507 100.0 
 Source : BT Annual Report     
Also, the stakeholders who owned over 3 percent stocks must notice to the BT and 
basically there was a constraint 15 percent share per the same person. In fact, the 
UK government really wanted to induce foreign capital, however, it regarded  
transferring the right of management to a foreigner as undesirable things. The 
government designed the Golden share and applied to 50 public enterprises. 
Golden share was a system that give special right which prevent to transfer a large 
                                            
15 The largest stakeholder is Legal & General Investment Management Ltd., 3.01 %  
15
number of property and revise the article of association the government. The UK 
government could commit veto about taking a director and changing the article of 
association but not exercise a voting right. In addition, the government had a right 
that could appoint two directors. On September 1997 when BT merged MIC, this 
was abolished. In a nutshell, after privatization, the government was related to the 
corporate governance to some degree. 
1.2.2 Current corporate governance 
  1.2.2.1 The board   
       As the distribution of ownership grows extended, the management 
separates from an owner, and manager-controlling system is established by what 
we called professional manager.16 A core corporate governance of the BT is the 
board. The BT’s board has a balance of executive(5) and non-executive(6) 
directors,17 with the latter outnumbering the executives. The roles of Chairman 
and CEO are split (Currently, Sir Christopher Bland is the Chairman, Ben 
Verwaayen is CEO). The non-executive directors are independent of BT. In fact, 
                                            
16  Because the producible resource is governed by a manager, we call this characteristic 
system ‘management control’ or ‘managerial capitalism’   
17 An outside director is a person who is not a full time director of a relevant firm and comes 
from other part. Due to this reason, we also call an outside director non-executive director. In 
the BT, non-executive directors are appointed initially for three years. At the end of that period, 
the appointment may be continued by mutual agreement.   
16
when we compare the board of the UK with that of the U.S., we can find some 
things. Like the BT, in the almost UK’s firm, the chairman and CEO are separated 
and the board strengthen the role of check to a manager. Only one- third firm has a 
system that the chairman hold a position of CEO at the same time (CEO duality) 
in the UK.18In the governance, this point is very important. Because CEO is the 
chairman at the same time, CEO has a great excessive effect on the selection of 
director. The average ratio of an outside director in the UK is 42 percent of total 
listed company in the stock market.        
The board of the BT is responsible for the group’s system of internal controls and 
risk management and for reviewing the effectiveness of these systems which are 
designed to manage, rather than eliminate, the risk of failure to achieve business 
objectives. Key features are (ⅰ) a group risk register identifying the group’s key 
risks and the means to manage and mitigate them, (ⅱ) a well established system 
of financial and business controls, the operation of which are regularly reported to 
the Group Finance Director and annually to the CEO, (ⅲ) regular assessments of 
internal controls by BT’s internal audit department and (ⅳ) the review of the 
effectiveness of the internal control processes by the Audit committee, on behalf 
                                            
18 Monks, Robert A.G. and Neil Minow, Corporate Governance Blackwell Business, 1995 
pp.183,188 
17
of the board.  
1.2.2.2 The principal board committees  
     If it let the board fulfill its function very well, the board must be operated 
with a several professional committees because some specialized committee 
consist of a professional person is not preparing for contents which will be 
discussed in the whole the board meeting until the board can exert function 
substantially. 19 Especially, the board can be classified three parts like the size of 
the board, CEO duality, and the board committee.20 The BT also has four 
principal board committees in order to enhance its function.  
Operating Committee: The Chief Executive chairs this committee. The committee 
has collective responsibility for running the group’s business end-to-end. To do 
that, it develops the group’s strategy and budget for agreement by the Board, 
recommends to the Board the group’s capital expenditure and customer quality of 
service performance of the whole group, plans and delivers major cross-business 
                                            
19  In the UK, the Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate 
Governance(Cadbury Report 1992) and the Report of the Committee on Corporate Governance 
Final Report(Hampel Report 1998) are the first sample rule about corporate governance. These 
reports have a basic sight that the board is the best system for check between a manager and 
stakeholders. Moreover, these reports assert a guarantee of independent the board, the audit 
committee consist of minimum 3 members and remuneration committee taken a lead by non-
executive directors.    
 World Bank , The Business Environment and Corporate Governance, 1998.  
20 Kim, Yong-Min, “The design and operation of creating value board”, The future management 
and development research Institution , 2000, pp.232    
18
programmes and reviews the senior talent base and succession plans of the group.  
  Nominating Committee:  This committee, consisting of the Chairman, the 
Deputy Chairman and two other non-executive directors, recommends to the 
Board appointments of all directors. To ensure an appropriate balance of expertise 
and ability, it has agreed, and regularly reviews, a profile of the skills and 
attributes required from the non-executive directors of candidates put forward by 
the directors and outside consultants. Candidates short-listed for appointment are 
met by the Committee before it recommends an appointment to the Board.  
 Remuneration Committee:  The committee comprises solely non-executive 
directors and is chaired by the Deputy Chairman. The committee sets the 
remuneration policy for the Chairman, the executive directors, the members of the 
company’s Operating Committee and senior executives reporting to the Chief 
Executive. Specifically, this committee agrees their service contracts, salaries, 
other benefits, including bonuses and participation in the company’s long-term 
incentive plans, and other terms and conditions of employment. It also agrees 
terms for their cessation of employment and their appointments as non-executive 
directors of non-BT Group companies and other organizations. It also approves 
changes in the company’s long term incentive plans, recommends to the Board 
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those plans which require shareholder approval and oversees their operation. 
  Audit Committee: This committee comprising solely non-executive directors is 
chaired by the Deputy Chairman. This committee reviews BT’s systems of internal 
control and risk management, considers the company’s published financial reports 
for statutory compliance and against standards of best practice and recommends to 
the Board appropriate disclosure in these reports. This committee also reviews 
annually the performance of the company’s auditors to ensure that an objective, 
professional and cost-effective relationship is maintained. It recommends to the 
Board the auditors’ fees for their audit services.    
 
  2. Nippon Telegraph and Telephone corporation 
 
2.1 Privatization 
 
   In 1974, the Japan’s economy showed a minus growth rate after the World War 
? for the first time and the public financial deficit was continued. Also, each 
national business and project such as the Japan National Railroad and the Medical 
Insurance Management Corporation etc. was confronted a severe management 
hardship and they were regarded as a crucial inefficient national problem. Thus, the 
government reform stated and as a set of this work, the public enterprise was 
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inquired in the whole part. At last, on March 1981, the Provisional Commission on 
Administrative Reform was created, and it presented the way of privatization. It 
selected the NTT as the main public enterprise for privatization because 
telecommunication technology grew fast and it was hard to keep the monopolized 
position. The core purpose of privatization of the NTT is as follow: first, securing 
money for returning its national debt, second, the abolishment of the government’s 
irrational control to a price policy, third, improving a management efficiency. A sale 
of the NTT started in 1986 and the process of a stock sale was found in a below 
table.            
< Table Ⅲ-3 > The result of a stock sale                    (unit: thousand) 
 Date 
The no. of 
share 
The ratio of 
share(%) 
The sale 
price 
(billion?) 
The change of 
the gov’t 
owned ratio 
First 
- first stage 
- sec. stage 
 
Oct.1986 
Nov.1986 
 
300 
1650 
 
1.3% 
10.6% 
 
2400 
 
100Æ88% 
List stock Feb. 1987 100 0.6%   
Second Nov. 1987 1950 12.5% 5000 88%Æ75.5% 
Third Oct. 1988 1500 9.6% 2800 75.5%Æ65.9%
 Source : KISDI,  A study of KT privatization strategy , 1993, annex A-5  
In the first sale, the government wanted to sell 7800 thousand shares which was 
50% of the total stocks by separating 4 time with each 1950 thousand through 
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offering stocks for public subscription after setting the stock price in the way of 
competitive tender. However, after the second sale, the stock price in the market 
radically decreased due to the black Monday on Oct.1987, the Gulf War, the NTT 
recruit scandal and a proposal of undecided dissolving the NTT etc. For this reason, 
the fourth sale could not be progressed.21 When the NTT listed its stocks in the 
market on February 1987, the government gave the NTT a privilege like below. 
< Table Ⅲ-4 >  The privilege when the NTT stock was listed. 
Existed rule Privilege for the NTT 
It is possible to list after 5 years establishing 
a firm.  
It is possible to list after transfer as a 
Limited company. 
It is possible to list after flowing over 50% 
of total stocks 
This rule didn’t apply to the NTT. 
( only 12.5% flowed)  
When it is listed for the first time, it can be 
enrolled only the second market. 
 It enrolled the first market in spite of first 
list. 
It must be traded only a unit of a thousand. It is possible to trade with one unit. 
  Source : KISDI, A study of KT privatization strategy , 1993, pp.102 
  Comprehensively, a privatization of the NTT is not successful for some reason. 
First and foremost, it is very hard to attain real benefit due to a continuous 
interruption of the government in a transitional period of a privatization. Moreover, it 
can really contrast with the BT. In the NTT case, the government didn’t cope with the 
worse stock market actively, however, the UK government inquired a capital market 
                                            
21 After this time, the government tried to sell its share and accomplished selling stocks on 
Dec.1998 and Oct. 2000 each one million numbers. 
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and prepared for an investment incentive to sell BT’s stock sale in advance.   
2.2 Ownership & Corporate governance 
 
2.2.1 Still the largest shareholder: the government  
    
    As Japan rebuilt its economy in the years following World War ?, it 
developed a unique corporate governance structure. One of the most notable 
features of this structure is powerful government intervention, dominated by the 
Japanese Ministry of Finance(MOF). MOF has maintained strong regulatory 
control of all Japan’s business, supervising every aspect of industrial activity 
including capital flows.22 This rule also can apply to the NTT. The NTT Law 
requires the government to own at least one-third of the total number of shares 
outstanding. Pursuant to the NTT Law, the proportion of voting rights of foreign 
nationals and foreign corporations is limited to less than one-third of the total 
voting rights. As of the end of March 2002, the number of shares owned by 
foreign nationals and foreign corporations was 2,187,752 or 13.59% of the 
16,134,590 shares outstanding. Moreover, there is a constraint of foreigner’s 
ownership until 20% of the total shares, and one person or institution can’t get 
10% according to the 10% test rule of the Foreign exchange and foreign trade 
                                            
22 Robert A.G. Monks & Nell Minow, Corporate Governance , Blackwell, 1995 pp.271 
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control law. A below table shows more detail ownership condition. 
< Table Ⅲ-5 > Principal shareholders of the NTT as of March 31, 2002 
 
Name Number of shares held 
Ratio of the number of 
shares held to the total 
number of shares issued(%)
The Ministry of Finance 7,413,823.26 45.95 
Japan Trustee Services 
Bank, Ltd. 
378,148.00 2.34 
The Mitsubisi Trust & 
Banking Corporation 
340,604.00 2.11 
Moxley and Company 250,612.00 1.55 
The Chase Manhattan Bank, 
N.A. London 
240,976.00 1.49 
UFJ Trust Bank, Ltd. 191,093.00 1.18 
State Street Bank & Trust 
company 
163,479.00 1.01 
NTT Employee Share-
Holding Association 
133,381.22 0.83 
Nippon Life insurance 
Company 
112,297,68 0.70 
Boston Safe Deposit BSDT 
Treaty Client Omnibus 
111,956.00 0.69 
         
   source: NTT annual Report 2002 
In addition, on the ground of the NTT law, NTT must obtain authorization 
from the Ministry of Public Management, Home Affairs, Posts and 
Telecommunications for certain financial matters including (1) any new issue of 
shares, convertible debentures or debentures with preemptive rights to acquire new 
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shares; (2)any resolution for (ⅰ) a change in the Articles of Incorporation, (ⅱ) an 
appropriation of profits or (ⅲ) any merger or dissolution; and (3) any disposition 
of major telecommunications trunk lines and equipment or providing mortgages on 
such properties. 
 
< Figure Ⅲ-1 > Distribution of Ownership among Shareholders ( % of total)   
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source: NTT annual Report 2002  
     
 2.2.2 Current corporate governance 
    The board 
    Currently, the NTT is functioning as a holding company for shares issued by NTT 
East Corporation and NTT West Corporation (hereinafter referred to as the Regional 
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Companies), and exercising rights as sole shareholder and owner. In fact, boards of 
Japanese companies are predominantly composed of directors promoted from within the 
company itself. When we compare the NTT with the BT, the most striking difference in 
the NTT boards is that most of the executive directors will have formerly been middle 
managers within the company who were promoted from inside so there is much less 
distinction between the firm’s ‘managers’ and the board. Also, Japanese company 
boards usually consist of a president (and sometimes a chairman who is nominally 
above the president in rank but often not in power), senior executive directors(senmu 
torishimariyaku) and other executive directors (jomu torishimariyaku and 
torishimariyaku). The board is therefore hierarchically ranked rather than functionally 
divided, although there may also be functional divisions between executive directors. 
     Although it’s not a duty, but there is also an outside director system in Japan. 
However, even the minor outside director came from related financial institution or 
subsidiaries. The role of directors from ‘outside’ the company is legally the same as that 
of inside directors and they are not regarded as independent of the company.  A below 
table shows that currently outside directors make up 25 percent in the 2200 odd 
companies listed on Japanese stock exchanges and that there has been little change since 
1985.  
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<Table Ⅲ-6> Origins of company directors of listed companies in Japan (unit: percent) 
 1984 1989 1994 Average 1984-1994 
Internal 74.2 75.6 73.1 75.1 
External 25.8 24.4 26.9 24.9 
  Other company 17.1 16.3 18.3 16.7 
  Bank 5.4 5.4 5.8 5.4 
Company 
Director 
  Government 3.3 2.7 2.8 2.8 
Internal • • • • 
External n.a 40.0 33.9 n.a 
  Other company n.a 29.7 22.7 n.a 
  Bank 7.1 6.3 6.8 6.8 
Senior 
Executive 
  Government 4.7 4.0 4.4 4.5 
Source: Morten Balling, Elizabeth Hennessy and Richard O’Brien Corporate Governance, 
Financial Markets and Global Convergence, 1998, Kluwer Academic Publishers pp.123 
    In the NTT, the board is composed of 16 directors: one president, four executive 
vice presidents, seven senior vice presidents and four auditors. Of these members, only 
two directors are an outside director in accordance with Paragraph 2,Item 7-2 of Article 
188 of the Commercial Code. Also, they are internal senior vice presidents. In 1993, the 
Japanese Commercial Code was revised and one of the important amended contents was 
a duty of creation of outside auditor. The NTT also must follow this law and it put two 
corporate outside auditors in accordance with Item 1 of 18 of the Law of Special 
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Exceptions to the Commercial Code regarding corporate auditing. However, due to the 
lack of independence of outside auditor, there are scarce effects.   
The remuneration committee and advisory board 
   When we inquired the BT board, we could find the principal board committee such 
as the Remuneration Committee, the Nominating committee and the Audit committee etc. 
because the BT’s board and an outside director system was developed very well. 
However, in the NTT (or most Japanese corporation), the board plays rarely their role. 
In other words, the board has a weak role of supervising to a manager because most 
directors are managers. In this condition, the NTT operated only the Remuneration 
Committee that is one of the crucial three committee for enhancing the board’s 
fulfillment was set up at the same time to ensure transparency, objectively and 
consistency in determining compensation for NEC’s top management. This committee 
reviews salary structures for directors and executive officers and deliberates on 
performance-linked remuneration and other topics. Moreover, the NTT established the 
Management Advisory Committee. This seeks to (1) evaluate research plans and 
achievements objectively and in a timely manner, (2) dispatch information effectively to 
the world through board members, and (3) reinforce systematic research cooperation 
with the board-member organizations. However, it’s main role is not supervisory of 
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managers. In a nutshell, in the NTT, the board, the core institution of corporate 
governance is not active and don’t check the manager. 
   
Ⅳ.THE DESIRABLE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND  
OWNERSHIP OF PRIVATIZED KT23 
     
 1.A plan and process of privatization in KT  
   
   1.1 From 1993 to 2002 
The government announced the panning of public enterprise privatization in 1987 for 
the first time. However, because the condition of stock market worse off after 1989, the 
privatization schedule was delayed. The real divestiture of KT started in 1993. During 
the 1993 - 1996 period, the government attempted to sell 49 percent of KT shares, but 
were able to sell only 28.8 percent for KRW2.751trillion to domestic investors. In 1999, 
the government sold 6.67 percent to foreign investors through issuing DRs that were 
listed on the NYSE and LSE and reduced its shares from 71.2 percent to 56.8 percent.24 
                                            
23 KT is one of the firms Fortune magazine’s Global 500 list. In recent Fortune(as of July 2002), 
a total of 12 Korean firms were ranked in Fortune magazine's Global 500 list, with Samsung 
Electronics taking 105th place. According to the U.S. business magazine, Samsung Corp. was 
ranked 118th this year, followed by SK Corp. (120th) and Hyundai Motor (133rd). Among other 
firms, LG Electronics ranked 202nd, Hyundai Corp. 219th, LG International 248th, Samsung 
Life Insurance 286th, SK Global 289th, KEPCO 324th, KT Corp. 413th and POSCO 494th, the 
magazine said. 
 
24 The Donga Ilbo, May 6th 2002  
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The sales brought in USD24.8566 billion, of which USD11.4723 billion went into the 
government coffer. Another effort at selling additional shares domestically early those 
year was unsuccessful. In 2001, KT had successfully raised $2.242 billion (2.9125 
trillion won) by selling a 17.78 percent stake held by the government to foreign 
investors. 25  Telecom operator sold off 111 million American depositary receipts 
(ADRs), representing around 55.5 million underlying shares listed on the Korea Stock 
Exchange, at $20.20 per share, or at a premium of 0.35 percent above the closing price 
of KT's shared on the Seoul bourse. But the issuing price of new ADRs, was at a 
discount of 0.74 percent of the closing price of KT's existing ADRs, listed on the New 
York Stock Exchange on the same day.  
However, most market experts hailed KT's ADR issue as a success, citing the 
compelling unfavorable conditions surrounding telecom companies around the world.  
After issuing DR, the government still had a 40.1 percent stake in Korea Telecom and 
was trying to sell up to 15 percent of shares to a foreign strategic investor. At last, the 
government and KT formed a strategic alliance with the world's largest software giant 
Microsoft Corp. as the government agreed to sell an 11.73 percent stake in KT valued at 
                                            
25 KT and the government were reportedly to set the issuing price at around 58,500 won 
($44.86) and thus raised around $2.5 billion by selling the stake. The issuing price of KT DRs 
was higher than its current share price. KT shares closed at 54,200 won 
30
$1.82 billion to overseas investors and Microsoft. Finally the government share was 
reduced to 28.3percent.  
1.2. In May 2002, the final stake sale 
Actually, the government regarded the privatization as the main duty during their 
tenure. To accomplish the perfect privatization within their tenure, the government 
announced that the state stake of 28.3 percent, or 88.57 million shares, in KT Corp., the 
state-run telecommunications giant, would be entirely sold off in shares and 
exchangeable bonds (EB) by the end of May. As for the detailed stake sale plan, the 
government would sell off 14.5 percent in shares and 13.87 percent in EB 
(exchangeable bonds)26. The domestic allocation plan is the same as following. The 
ministry said it would offer 14.5 percent of KT shares to various local investors. Of the 
amount, about 5.67 percent would be allocated to KT employees, 2 percent was going to 
be placed with local institutional investors, 1.83 percent with retail investors, and 5 
percent with a strategic alliance partner. (Total 14.5%) The remaining 13.87 would be 
offered to local investors in the form of exchangeable bonds. The prospective alliance 
partner would be able to buy exchangeable bonds representing up to a 10 percent stake 
in the company. No single buyer would be able to buy more than a 15 percent stake, the 
                                            
26 Exchangeable bonds were a type of bonds that can be converted to equity shares. 
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MIC (Ministry of Information and Communications) said. To prevent form any 
dominant rule by conglomerate and follow the model of POSCO CO., this complicated 
rule was planned. 
 
 However, the result was very different. Unfortunately, the MIC failed to grab due 
credit. Instead it was SK Telecom that stole the show by acquiring an 11.34 percent 
stake in KT with its enormous cash reserves. SK Telecom was known to have spent 
around 2 trillion won to become the largest shareholder in KT, showing off its powerful 
information-gathering capabilities and strategy to triumph over other conglomerates, 
notably Samsung and LG Group. SK Telecom was now scrambling to portray its KT 
stake purchase as a benign attempt to defend its business. SKT said it had no other 
choice but to purchase the stake in an unusual way in order to handle the share overhang 
problem and block its rival Samsung Group from securing a significant portion of the 
KT stake.27 Due to the lambaste and pressure of the MIC, SKT sold 1.79% EB to the 
other institutional investors on July 16th, 2002. Finally, the KT privatization was over.28 
                                            
27 KT has a 9.27 percent stake in SK Telecom. 
 
28  Originally, a holding share-limitation of foreigners was 37.2% according to the Law 
regarding the Management Structure Enhancement and Privatization of Public Enterprise, 
however, after privatization, on the ground of Articles of Incorporation, a constraint ownership 
of foreigners extended to 49%. 
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< Table Ⅳ-1 >  Equity and EB Allocation Result of total the government share 
Equity EB 
 
Total 
Allocation Original
plan 
result Original 
plan 
result 
Institutional Investor Group 4% 2% 2.22% 2% 1.78%
Strategic Investor 15% 5% 10.77% 10% 4.23%
Individual Investor 3.66% 1.83% 2.17% 1.87% 1.49%
ESOA(Employee Stock 
Ownership Association) 
5.67% 5.67% 5.67%  
Additional EB Subscription 0.04%  0.04%
Total 28.37% 14.5% 20.83% 13.87% 7.54%
Source: Korea Telecom company data 
 
< Figure Ⅳ-1  > The shareholders of KT as of May 25, 2002 
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<Table Ⅳ-2 > A summary of KT privatization 
Date Content 
May-1987 The government announced a plan of PE privatization. 
Oct- 1993 1st domestic sale (10%) 
Apr-1994 2nd domestic sale (4.96%) 
Nov-1994 3rd domestic sale (5.04%) 
Oct-1996 4th domestic sale (0.05%) 
Nov-1996 5th domestic sale (2.43%) 
Nov-1996 6th domestic sale (3.32%) 
Dec-1996 7th domestic sale (3%) 
Dec-1998 Listed on the Korea Stock Exchange 
May-1999 1st issued oversea DR (6.67%) 
Feb-2001 8th domestic sale (1.07%) 
June-2001 2nd issued oversea DR (17.87%) 
Dec-2001 Finally formed a strategic alliance with MS. as the government agreed to 
sell an 11.73% stake in KT  
May15th 2002 Book building for institutional 
May 17th Announcement of equity price 
May 17th- 18th Equity subscription for strategic, institutional & retail investors 
May 20th  Additional subscription for equity 
May 23rd Announcement of equity allocation 
May 25th Stock delivery Æ finishing a privatization 
July 16th SKT sold its exchangeable bonds (EBs) of KT Corp., equivalent to 1.79 
percent equity, to institutional investors 
 
Source: KISDI , “A study of KT strategic alliance” 1999 pp.2-5 , KT Annual Report 
  
2. An issue related to an ownership & governance of privatization in KT 
        
     2.1 The largest owner, the government in the process of privatization 
      
          In practice, the government asked the KT to play a role as a public enterprise 
even if privatizing process. Moreover, on October 1997, the KT was changed as a 
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Limited company by the Commercial Code. According to the Commercial Code, 
the changed governance item was as below table. 
     < Table Ⅳ-3 > The changed governance item when transferring as the State-
Owned Corporate  
 Before SOC After SOC 
Purpose of management Minster of finance gave it. Decided in the board. 
Evaluation of 
management 
The part of gov’t 
management evaluation 
graded it. 
Evaluated in the board 
Supervise Comprehensible supervise
After work regulation by 
the shareholder’s right 
Outside Audit 
The Board of Audit and 
Inspection  &  the 
Parliamentary inspection 
of the administration 
1) If there is a specific 
reason 
  2) If there is a 
 parliamentary resolution 
      Source:  Korea Telecommunication internal news letter, Sep.1997 pp.36 
       However, in spite of transferring as a SOC, the KT still was controlled by  the 
government like regular Parliamentary inspection of the administration. 
           The government owns 59% of outstanding shares and is committed to selling 
down to 33% by the end of 2000 and still committed a variety of pressure to KT. For 
example, although in 1998, KT is given complete independence to set its own 
budgets and business plan without interference the Ministry of Information and 
Communications (MIC) requested the firm to hurry up constructing ADSL without 
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the managerial efficiency and improvement. To make this basement, it needed 
around 8 trillion won. In addition, it asked 750billion won for establishing new 
network. Also, in the first privatization stage, although KT wanted to find oversea 
sale for maximizing earning, the MIC preferred to sell the SK. That is, the 
government had contradictable behavior: while propelled the privatization, it still 
asked to pursue the attainment of nation’s goal. A unilaterally synthetic intervention 
in the process of privatization results in the delay, confused direction and managerial 
inefficiency finally. In the process of a privatization, although the government is the 
largest shareholder, it should not intervene a management of a public enterprise. 
Issuing DR or forming a strategic alliance with other foreign companies, the 
government’s willing has a great effect on the contract. Also, foreign investors 
always watch the behavior of government. If there is a deep managerial interruption 
of government, it gives an effect on the stock market. At last, the sale of public 
enterprise gets an effect such as postponement.  
               
      2.2 A foreign ownership limitation problem 
           
  Revision of KT Corporation’s Articles of Incorporation will enable foreign 
investors to purchase an additional 11.8% of common shares through the Korea 
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Stock Exchange starting August 21, 2002 after privatization. 29  The 
Telecommunications Business Law limits the aggregate foreign ownership of KT 
Corporation (“KT”) to 49%. In addition, pursuant to authorization granted under the 
Privatization Law, KT’s Articles of Incorporation currently allows the following 
methods for foreign investors to acquire KT shares: 5% through the Korea Stock 
Exchange, ADRs, withdrawal of underlying shares under ADR programs, exercise 
of warrants, conversion rights of convertible bonds or exchange rights under bonds 
exchangeable into shares, and direct investments under the Foreign Investment 
Promotion Law. Due to these restrictions, effective shareholding of KT’s shares by 
foreign investors have been limited to 37.2% so far. With the completion of the 
privatization of KT in May 2002, the Privatization Law will cease to apply to KT 
after the extraordinary general shareholders’ meeting scheduled for August 20, 2002. 
At the meeting, KT plans to propose for an elimination of above restrictions from its 
Articles of Incorporation.  As a result, upon the resolution of the shareholders’ 
meeting, foreign investors will be able to increase their aggregate share ownership 
                                            
      29    KT: Listed on the Korea Stock Exchange in December, 1998  
           Increase in foreign ownership through issuance of DR 
Foreign shareholders           
Government 
Domestic 
Shareholders Domestic market DR 
59.0% 21.6% 5.0% 14.4% 
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from the current 37.2% to 49% by purchasing additional shares through the Korea 
Stock Exchanges starting August 21, 2002.30   In the event that the foreign 
ownership is increased above 37.2%, elimination of above restrictions in the 
Articles of Incorporation may adversely affect the ability of KT to deliver shares to 
foreigners upon conversion of convertible notes issued on January 4, 2002 and the 
exercise of bonds with warrants issued on January 3, 2002. 
      If foreign investors acquire an additional 11.8% and conversion of convertible 
bonds or exercise of warrants result in the violation of the 49% foreign ownership 
limitation under the Telecommunications Business Law, such conversion or 
exercise will be effectively prohibited. In such an event, KT will pay cash to the 
relevant CB or BW holders exercising conversion rights or warrants, in accordance 
with the terms of the convertible bonds and the bonds with warrants.  
           However, as the share of foreign investor grows, the KT should consider   
foreign investors. Because the most of foreign investors buy stocks for the purpose 
                                            
30    There are two restrictions on the ownership of KT shares in addition to the 15 percent 
ceiling for any single party. First, the Telecommunications Industry Act puts a ceiling on 
the combined ownership in KT by foreign investors at 49 percent. Second, the act also 
forbids a foreigner to become the largest shareholder of KT. The last restriction on the 
ownership of KT was introduced to maintain KT as a Korean firm. But, no such 
restriction exists for SKT or any other telecom operator in Korea. 
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of portfolio, the KT must try to more consider allocation policy, a management of 
stock price and induce long term investors like pension fund, insurance.               
       
 2.3 A hardship of accomplishing distributive ownership  
          In the sale of public enterprise, it is very important that economic 
concentration. In fact, telecommunications has economic characteristics that are 
different to those found in more normal markets in many countries. There is 
almost one market. The KT is a kind of natural monopoly type in Korea.31 
Therefore, the government put its heart not concentrating on one large shareholder 
like a chaebol. In fact, there is no domestic investor who can take over a pubic 
enterprise with a large amount of capital except a chaebol. One of the most crucial 
reason that brought out a financial crisis was a wrong corporate governance 
structure of a chaebol. Thus the government really tried to prohibit converging a 
chaebol’s ownership. It designed equipment that would make the largest 
stockholder. For instance, no single buyer will be able to buy more than a 15 
percent stake. Also, it classified a chaebol as a strategic investor.32 A strategic 
                                            
31 After a privatization, in order to prevent this radical change of governance and management 
rights, the BT used Golden Share and the France government used the GAS(groupe 
d’actionnaires stables). 
32 In those days, the Samsung, a major family-owned conglomerate or chaebol, was expected to 
purchase slightly less than 3 percent stake in KT while its rivals – LG and SK – might make a 
similar move.  
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investor would be able to receive a 5 percent stake, institutional investors 2 
percent and retail investors 1.83 percent. The strategic investor would be given a 
right to purchase EBs (exchangeable bonds) worth 200 percent of the stake it 
bought, while institutional and retail investors would be allowed to purchase EBs 
worth 100 percent of their holdings. However, these government’s efforts became 
bubbles. SK Telecom had secured a 9.55 percent stake in KT Corp., by 
additionally subscribing to acquire a 5.77 percent stake, on top of the 3.78 percent 
stake.33  Although the government exercised great efforts, it failed to show a 
prohibition of the largest shareholders.  Moreover, this result that was like 
oligopoly with alliance was on the verge of no competition, delay of developing 
next communication method and collusion price policy.         
  
   3.Efficient distributive ownership and professional management structure 
  
    3.1 Rearrangement of the board role 
        In principle, the board of directors was responsible for monitoring and       
                                            
 
33 SK Telecom high position official announced SK Telecom’s massive acquisition of KT Corp. 
stock was aimed at preventing Samsung Group’s possible takeover of the wired carrier. He also 
said the company wanted to offset KT’s ability to influence the price of SK Telecom stock with 
its 9.27 percent stake in SK Telecom. The two company agreed on equity swap on Nov. 2002: 
securities to be sold to SK Telecom-8,266,923 common shares of SK Telecom owned by KT 
Corporation and securities to be purchased by KT Corporation-29,808,333 common shares of 
KT Corporation owned by SK Telecom.  
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disciplining managers and for mitigating opportunistic behavior by controlling 
shareholders. In Korea Telecom, even though governing under the Commercial 
Code, however, few boards of directors pursued such actions. The legal 
responsibilities of directors were based on the principle of “duty of care” .Under 
this principle, directors were given the benefit of the doubt when questions of 
conflicts of interest arose. Their willfulness or negligence had to be legally 
proven beyond a shadow of a doubt. After privatization, the main principle 
between the board and the manager of KT was established. In the new Article of 
Incorporation, the new role of board was given: the BOD could (1) conduct 
performance review to determine if the new President performed his duties 
under the management contract or hire a professional evaluation agency for such 
purpose (2) submit a proposal for dismissal based on the result of its 
performance review, to the General Shareholders’ Meeting (3) determine yearly 
management goals for the president within the scope of target achievements 
during the term of office, which are subject to approval of the General 
Shareholders’ Meeting (4) report the result of its performance review to the 
General Shareholders’ Meeting. The board had a position that could check the  
management confirmly. Therefore, in the privatized KT, the follow rule must be 
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manifested. According to the Basic Law Regarding the Management of 
Government-Owned Corporation since Feb. 1999, the internal board system of 
the KT was changed. The government –appointed board of directors was 
abolished and changed to a coexistence system of executive and non-executive 
directors. The outside director became a core of the board: (1) participates and 
admits the management strategy making (2) decides a main managerial purpose 
and result (3) evaluates manager and decides compensation. On the other hand, 
the inside director and managers have a full right about company’s operation. 
The size of the board increased from 13(inside 5, outside 7) to 15(inside 6, 
outside 9)34. Thus because the privatized KT board pursues to the Anglo-
American boarding system which regards the outside director as core part, it 
must reorganize centering outside director and must accomplish efficient 
managerial system. In addition, after privatization, the Articles of incorporation 
of KT was amended or deleted such as Article 26.35 That is, after financial crisis, 
Korea was transferred to the shareholders capitalism containing small 
shareholders. The following table shows the changes in the minimum proportion 
of shares required for each minority shareholders right. 
                                            
34 The current CEO is LEE, Yong-Kyung.  
35 Top 13 shareholders in proportion to their respective shareholdings as of the record date or 
the date of closing of the register of Shareholders. 
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       < Table Ⅳ- 4 > Minority shareholders rights in Korea 
       Security Exchange Law 
(applicable for listed company ) 
Commercial Code 
(applicable for unlisted 
company ) 
Minority shareholders 
right 
Revised 
April 
1997 
Revised 
Feb. 
1998 
Revised 
May 1998 
Before 
Revision 
Revised 
Dec. 1998 
Derivative suit against 
the management 
1% 
(0.5%) 
0.05% 0.01% 5% 1% 
Request to remove 
directors 
1% 
(0.5%) 
0.5% 
0.5% 
(0.25%) 
5% 1% 
Opening financial 
books 
3% 
(1.5%) 
1% 
(0.5%) 
1% 
(0.5%) 
5% 3% 
Shareholder proposal  
to shareholders 
meeting 
1% 
(0.5%) 
1% 
(0.5%) 
1% 
(0.5%) 
- 3% 
       The numbers in the parenthesis is for a company with a paid-in-capital over 100 
billion won. 
         Source: Ha-sung Jang, “Privatization and Corporate Governance of SOEs in 
Korea”, 2000, OECD pp.6   
       Improved shareholder’s rights enhance the market monitoring function. Therefore, 
the current board should try to consider the minority shareholders rights in order to 
reach amicable result in the Shareholder’s committee.  
  3.2 Trying to find efficient Outside director 36  appointment method, 
process and remuneration  
                                            
36 The director can be classified with large five category: executive director(inside director), 
affiliated director, family director, shadow director, outside director etc. 
Finkelstein, S. & D.C. Hambrick, 1995, “Strategic leadership: Top executives and their effects 
on organizations” St. Paul, MN: West Publishing Company. 
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         Outsider directors are not dependent on the chief executive for promotion, or 
for legal or consulting business. Thus, they are relatively free from conflicts of 
interest, and better able to protect the owners’ interests. This philosophy 
prompted companies to raise the number of outside directors in KT’s 
boardrooms, and, more importantly, the ratio of outsiders to insiders on the 
typical board. Currently, the ratio of outside director is increased after a financial 
crisis, the origin structure is as follow. 
        < Table Ⅳ-5 > Comparing with the origin structure of outside director (unit:%) 
      Manager Academic
People 
Leagal 
profession
Accouter The press, 
Doctor 
Gov’ 
officer 
Etc.
Korea 30.2 19.3 11.0 8.7 3.3 3.3 23.2
U.S 81.1 9.8 1.3 2.3 1.9 1.9 1.0
         Source: Yong Yul Kim, Chang Hyun Cho, Myung Hyun Cho,” The 
Corporate Governance Reform for a leap of advanced economy” 2000,Seoul, 
Korea Institute for Industrial Economics & Trade pp.202 
        On the other hand, the KT origin structure is the same as a below table. 
          < Table Ⅳ-6 > Comparing with the origin structure of outside director of KT 
      Manager Academic
People 
Leagal 
profession
Accouter The press, 
Doctor 
Gov’ 
officer 
Etc.
KT 3 2 2 • 2 • • 
Before privatization, the Shareholers’ Committee was able to 
recommend candidates for non-standing director, however, now right to recommend 
candidates for non-standing director was transferred to Outside Director Candidates 
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Recommendation Committee within the board of directors (the Article 41 in the 
Articles of Incorporation). In fact, the largest shareholder’s intention had a great 
effect on the appointment of an outsider director considering not his professional 
background but his relationship with the largest shareholder. The most important 
role of outside directors is not representing interests of specific shareholder such as 
largest shareholder and minority shareholders’ group but maximizing benefit of 
whole shareholders. Thus, through professional committee, the outside directors 
should be elected.  
 
< Table Ⅳ-7  > List of stock-option grantee 
 
No. Name Postion Title 
Max. 
# of shares 
for stock 
options 
# of shares 
linked to 
performance
1 Yong 
Kyung Lee 
President Standing 
Director 
300,000 100,000 
2 Tai-Won 
Chung 
Senior Executive 
Vice President 
Standing 
Director 
100,000 30,000 
3 Young 
Han Song 
Executive Vice 
President 
Standing 
Director 
60,000 20,000 
4 Joong Soo 
Nam 
Executive Vice 
President 
Standing 
Director 
60,000 20,000 
5 An Yong 
Choi 
Executive Vice 
President 
Standing 
Director 
60,000 20,000 
6 Hong-Seek 
Chun 
Executive Vice 
President 
Standing 
Auditor 
100,000 30,000 
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• Formula for # of shares paid based on 2003 performance 
- # of shares linked to performance x (100/30 x (performance score –70))% 
• Exercise price: 70,000 won 
• Exercise period: December 27, 2004 ~ December 26, 2009 
- 2004.12. 27 ~ 2005.12. 26 – 1/3 is exercisable 
- 2005.12.27 ~ 2006.12.26 – 2/3 is exercisable 
- 2007.12.27 ~ 2009.12.26 – 100% is exercisable 
• Some of the treasury shares acquired from the equity swap with SKT will be used for 
the stock options 
   Source: KT internal data 
            In addition, it needs additional incentive system in order to guarantee 
independence and enhance responsibility of outside director. Table Ⅳ-7 shows a 
current incentive system of KT.  To strengthen shareholder-oriented management, 
and to reinforce responsible management, KT Board of Directors has approved to 
grant stock options to five standing directors and a standing auditor. Moreover, among 
the total number of shares granted to each grantee, some portion will be paid based on 
their 2003 performance.  
      Recently, when we consider the importance of outside directors, it is hard to 
induce to maximize the value of a KT only regular salary. Also, it is desirable to give 
stock-option and prohibit sell for a decided period. Thus, by connecting their interest 
relationship to long term corporation value, it has them to induce to improve the value 
of KT. 
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       3.3 Actualizing principal board committees 
According to the Basic Law Regarding the Management of Government-Owned 
Corporation since Feb. 1999, the CEOs of the KT37 were recruited openly by a 
“presidential nomination committee” and were recruited to sign management 
performance contracts for their jobs. Also, there was external monitoring of 
management and the CEO, the knowledge-based management systems, and the 
economic value-added (EVA) system. The managerial technique of EVA might 
provide employees compensation and enhance share values before might provide 
employees compensation and enhance share values before privatization (MPB,2000 )  
In addition, to attain efficient corporate governance and ownership system, KT 
should actualize other committees. Now, KT has several committees: the legal 
committee, the nominating committee which is composed of one executive director 
and four outsider directors, the management committee, remuneration committee 
which is consist of five outsider directors, the budget consulting committee which  
                                            
37 Former CEO background of KT 
1st: 1981-1988 Army general, Parliament member 
2nd: 1988-1990 Deputy minister of Ministry of Communications 
3rd: 1993-1995 Professor 
4th: 1995-1996 Army general  
5th: 1996-1997 Deputy minister of Ministry of Communications 
  6th: 1997-2000 the first internal promotion 
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comprises four outsider director and a temporary executive director. As the former BT   
case, vigorous principal board committees can enhance the transparent management.  
    3.4 Strengthen the audit committee function  
        Within the system of corporation governance, the audit is often regarded as highly 
important. At the same time, however, there is the so-called expectation gap-i.e., a 
discrepancy between what the shareholders and other addresses of the audit expect 
and what the audit is actually able to achieve-to be observed on either side. In 
accordance with current law, the auditor already has two functions within the system 
of corporate governance: on the one hand, the auditor guarantees the reliability of 
the information disclosed by the company; on the other hand, the auditor also has to 
evaluate and to report on the economic position of the company in the auditor’s 
report that must not become subject to public disclosure.  
         Under Korean law and KT articles of incorporation, KT must have one statutory 
auditor. A statutory auditor38 was elected by the shareholders and serves a three-year 
term which expires at the close of the general shareholders meeting convened in 
respect of the last fiscal year of that term. A statutory auditor was not required to be a 
certified public accountant. With the completion of the privatization of KT 
                                            
38 The most current statutory auditor was Hong-Seek Chun, who has served in his current 
position since March 2000.The statutory auditor was entitled to attend and express opinions at 
meetings of the board of directors, but does not vote. 
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Corporation, KT should establish an audit committee to replace the statutory auditor 
in accordance with the Securities and Exchange Act.39 On March 2003, KT will 
abolish a statuary auditor and establish audit committee.With the board, the audit role 
is the core of governance. Thus, the KT must clarify the duties of audit committee: 
examining the agenda for, and the financial statements and other reports to be 
submitted by the board of directors, a general meeting of shareholders and reviewing 
the administration of each affairs by the board of directors.  
   
    
Ⅴ.  CONCLUSION 
      This paper has investigated the process of perfect KT privatization and 
searches the efficient ownership and governance structure. In fact, the main 
difference between a public enterprise and a private corporation is the ownership 
problem, what is called a principal-agent problem. Consequently, in the present 
situation, the crucial ingredient of corporate governance and ownership problem is 
the board. Like BT and other western nations, outsider director problems, sub-
committees and the auditor or audit committee are core parts. In KT case, the 
                                            
39 According to the Securities and Exchange Act, a listed firm which has over 2 trillion 
must make a audit committee. 
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allocation of stake on May this year has many meanings.  
In a nutshell, including SKT’s share–purchase and probability of monopoly issue, 
first and foremost, KT should accomplish distributive ownership and professional 
management structure: trying to find methods actualizing the board commitment, 
appropriate outsider director works, practical plans boosting the principal methods 
and audit function.  
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